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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
A.DoPTION-!NHr:RITANO: FROM NATURAL KINDRJW.-The plaintiff, a minor,
by his guardian sued to recover his share of his deceased grandfather's estate
under the law of succession of the state of California. After the death of
his father and mother he had been adopted into another family. The statute
of California provides that the natural parents of an adopted child are
"relieved * * * of all parental duties towards and all responsibilities for the
child so adopted and have no right over it," and the child and persons adopting "shail sustain towards each other the legal .relation !)f parent and child
and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties. of that relation."
Held, that this statute would be construed strictly and the child adopted
would still inherit from the natural kindred other than his father and
mother. In Re Darling's Estate (Calif. 1916), 159 Pac. 6o6.
Adoption, though not recognized under the common law, is allowed by
statute in this country. Being in derogation of the common law adoption
statutes are usually construed strictly against the adopte'd child, Hockaday
v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456; Keeghan v. Geraghty, 101 IlL 26. It has been held generally that the child may inherit from its adoptive parents, ..Flannigan v. How-·
ard, 200 Ill. 3g6; Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. x6o. But unless the statute
expressly so provides, the adoptive child cannot inherit from the kindred of
its adoptive parents. Van Derl<J•n v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146; Hockaday v. Lynn,
supra,· Estate of Jobson, 164 cat. 312. Unless the statute expressly provides
to the contrary. the adopted child will inherit from the natural as well as
from the adoptive parents. Wagner v. Varner, 50 Ia. 532; Clarkson v. !latton, I43 Mo. 47. But the statute in California expressly provides that all
parental relations are at an end between the natural parents and the child,
and so he could not inherit from them. Does it prevent his inheriting from
his own kindred other than his natural parents? The principal case holds
that it does not, on the ground that these statutes must be construed no
more liberally than the words require. Under a similar statute in Massachusetts, however, it was held the child could not inherit fro~ the grandfather both as a child and as a grandchild where he had been adopted by the
grandfather after his father's death. Delano v. Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619.
Contra, Wagner v. Varner, supra. But the principal case is distinguishable
on its facts from the Massachusetts case and seems to accord with the
trend of authority.
·
ANIMALS-STRAYING UroN TH£ HIGHWAY.-Plaintiff's automobile was upset and damaged by defendant's sheep which had escaped to the highway
through a defective hedge. The sheep were on the road in violation of § 25
of the Highway Act, 1864, under which defendant was subsequently prosecuted and fined. Held, Defendant was under no duty to plaintiff as a member of the public to keep sheep, not shown to be vicious or mischievous, from
straying on the highway, and was therefore not liable for the injury caused
by them. Heath's Garage Limited v. Hodges [1916], 2 K. B. 370.
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In Hadwell v. Righton [1907], 2 K. B. 345, "the hen and bicycle case," and
Higgins v. Searle [1909], 100 L. T. :z8o, "the pig and motor-car case," the
animals causing the damage were improperly in the highway, and both decisions are authority for the holding in the principal case that the owner is
not liable where the injury is not the natural result of vicious propensities.
In an analysis of Higgins v. Searle, supra, found in 73 J. P. 214, 1;he plaintiff's
failure to recover on § 2s of the Highway Act was explained on the ground
that the purpose of that act was· to prevent the physical obstruction of the
. highway, and that liability under a statute only extends to the mischief
against which the enactment is intended to guard. In that case a sow
frightened a horse. This suggestion would not explain the conclusion in the
principal case, in which the sheep did actually obstruct the highway to plaintiff's injury. The American decisions are not entirely agreed. Many cases
hold that where the animal, though not by nature vicious, is unlawfully in
the highway, the owner is liable for any injuries directly resulting, Jewett
v. Gage, SS Me. 538, 92 Am. Dec. 61s; Shipley v. Colclough, 81 Mich. 624. 45
N:. W. no6; Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. n3, 44 Am. Rep. 20s; West gate v.
Carr, 43 Ill. 4SO; Fallon v. O'Brien, l~ R. I. 518, 34 Am..Rep. 713. Other
cases hold that the owner is not liable for the injuries of the trespassing
animals without proof of scienter, Kilchers v. Elliot, n4 Ala. 290, 21 So. 96S;
Ramsey v. Martin, 4S Pa. Super. Ct.· tits; Dufer Y. Cully, 3 Or. 377; Klenberg
v. Russell, 12S Ind. 531, 2s N'. E. 596; Harvey v. B11chanan, 121 Ga 384;
Meegan Bros. v. McKa31, i Okla. S9·

BANKRUPTCY-D1scHARGt Rn'usni BtcAuss oF FAr.ss OA~H.-§ l4b of the
BANKRUP'XCY Ac:r provides, as a ground for refusing to discharge - a bankrupt, that he has "committed an offense punishable by imprisonment."
§ 29b (2) provides for punishment if one "has made a false oath or account
in, or relation to, any proceeding in bankruptcy." Held, that the making of
a false oath in a proceeding other than his own was ground for refusing his
discharge. In the Matter of Lesser, Bankrupt (C. C. A. 1916), 234 Fed. 65.
· There is no other decision directly in point, but only a dictum in the Blalock case (n8 Fed. 679), in which the offense was not "knowingly and fraudulently'' committed. It is impossible for a bankrupt to commit many of the
offenses enumerated in § 29 in his own proceeding: he cannot in his own
proceeding embezzle property belonging to a bankrupt estate which comes
into his charge as trustee; nor procure a false claim; nor receive money from
a bankrupt after petition filed against him. Hence the court argues that a
false oath in "any proceeding in bankruptcy'' means exactly what it says.
Nor do the decisions cut down this doctrine. § 7 of the Act requires submission by the bankrupt to certain examinations, and provides that testimony so obtained shall not be used against the bankrupt in any criminal
proceeding. In re Mar~, 102 Fed. 676, holds that this provision should be
read in ~s an exception to ·the general language of -§ 29b (2), but is overruled by In re Ga3•lord, u2 Fed. 668. "The contention that the perjury must
be committed in his own bankruptcy is contrary to the letter of the law" and
"there is nothing compelling such a construction."
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·BANKRUP'.rCY-S~NDTHRIF'.r

TRusT AS Assi;r o~ TRusTEt.-§ g8 of the
PRoP1'RTY LAW of New York provides that the surplus income of
spendthrift trusts, beyond the sum necessary for the education and support
of the beneficiary, shall be liable to the claims of his creditors in the same
manner as other personal property which cannot be reached by execution.
~ 47a (2) (amendment of 1910) of the BANKRUP'.rCY Ac:r provides that the
trustee in bankruptcy "as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy
court shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a
judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied.". Held,·
that the trustee in bankruptcy of the beneficiary was entitled to the surplus
income of a spendthrift trust. 'Jenks v. Titie Guarantee Co., 170 App. Div;
(N. Y.) 830, 156 N. Y. Supp. 478.
The trust~e cannot claim this surplus under § 7oa (5) as "property which
prior to the filing of the petition he [the bankrupt] could by any means have
transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him," Butler v. Baudowne, &i App. Div. 215, 179 N. Y. 530,
but a judgment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied can reach this
asset in equity, under § g8 of the Rs-.\!, PRoPmtTY LAw, Dittmar v. Gould, 6o
App. Div. 94 and, through holding no specific lien, is thus preferred over
general creditors. But since the 1910 amendment of § 47a (2), the trustee is
vested with the "rights, remedies and powers of a creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied" and, as in the instant case, can reach this
surplus. In Massachusetts, as in New York and the majority of states, it
is permissible tO settle the entire income on the beneficiary in such manner
that it cannoi be alienated by him or taken by his creditors in advance of
payment to him, Broadway Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 23 Am. Rep. 504
·Since iµ such states there is no statute corresponding to § g8 of the lliiAL
PROP.ERTY LAW of New York, the trustee cannot recover any of the income
under § 47a (2), while the terms of the trust itself, preventing it from being
alienated by the bankrupt or reached by judicial process against him,
make recovery impossible by the trustee in bankruptcy under § 7oa
(5). Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trt1st Co., 240 U. S. 427, 36
Sup. Ct. 391. In the Eaton case, even though the interest could be transferred by the bankrupt and would seem to pass to the trustee in bankruptcy
as coming within the exact terms of § 7oa (5), Justice HoLMts "holds the
restricting clause paramount" and says that "the power of alienation will not
be pressed to a point inconsistent with the dominant intent of the will."
The fact that the creation of the 'trust and the death of the testator both
occurred before the passage of the bankruptcy act tend to make justifiable the
court's refusal to apply broadly § 7oa (5). In those states which are committed to the English rule that a debtor cannot retain any beneficial interest
beyond the reach of a creditor's bill, Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429;
Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205, such a trust is not often created and this
question can seldom arise. If created the trust would undoubtedly pass to
the trustee in bankruptcy, under § 47a (2).
~L

MICHIGAN LAW RSVIEW
BII.Ls AND Nons-AcCRu.AL OF Ac:r10N.-A promissory note was dtte April
at X Bank. Demand being made and payment refused on that day, suit
was commenced after banking hours on the same day. Held, the suit was
not prematurely brought as the holder's right of action accrued at the expiration of banking hours. Williams v. Cumberland Fertilizer Co. (Ga. App.
1916), 8g S. E. 1091.
The~e is ~ well-defined split of authority in cases of this kind. Where a
note is payable generally, the maker has the whole of the day of maturity
in :which to mall:e payment,. since the law does not recognize parts of a day,
and suit is prematurely brought if commenced on that day even though it be
after a demand and refusal. Wilcombe v. Dodge, 3 Cal. 200; Davis v. Eppinger, 18 Cal. 379; Taylor v. Jacoby, 2 Barr 495; Bevin v. Eldridge, 2 Miles
353; Walter v. Kirk, 14 Ill. 55; Hamilton eo. v. Sinker-Davis Co., 74 Tex. 51;
Kennedy v. Thomas, L. R. [1894], 2 Q. B. 7"59· Contra,-on the ground that
when the maker of a note inakes it payable on a day certain his contract is
to pay it on demand on any part of that day if made at reasonable hours, and
hence as soon as payment is refused the right of action of the holder accrues
and suit may be. commenced immedi~tely-Staples v. Bank, I Mete. 43; Amidown v. Woodman, 31 Me. 581; Greeley v. Thurston, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 479;
Vandesande v. Chapman, 48 Me. 262; Pierce v. Cate, 12 Cush. 190; Wilson
v. Willimon, I Nott & McC,ord 440; Colemon v. Ewing, 4 Hump. 240; 2
DANDU., N~. !NSTRS., 1356. But suit brought on that day without demand
and refusal is premature. Estes v. Tower, 102 Mass. 65. Where the note
is payable at a bank, some jurisdictions hold in accord with the principal case
that. the maker's contract is to pay on the
of maturity during banking
hours, and hence that the holder's right of action accrues witli the expiration. of such banking hours. As the maker has agreed to pay at the bank
that day, it would seem the time of payment is necessa;ily limited. to the
hours within which the bank is open in the due course of business to receive
payment. Osborne v. Rogers, II2 N. Y. S73i Humphrey v. Sutcliffe, Ig2 Pa..
St. 336. But other cases hold that the maker is entitled to the whole of the
day of maturity in which to make payment where the note is payable at a
bank even though actual demand and refusal have been made. Oothout v.
Ballard, 41 Barb. 33; Smith v. Aylesworth, 40 Barb. 104; Sutcliffe v. Humph1'eys, 58 N. J. L. 42; Benson.v. Adams, 6g Ind. 353, 35 Am St. Rep. 220; National Bank v. Salina Paper Co., 58 Kan. 207.
I

day

Brr.r.s AND NOTts--Ar.'tSRATION.-A note stipulated that the drawers, indorsers, and sureties waived presentment for payment, protest, and notice
of protest. and non-payment; and agreed that the time of payment might be
exte~ded without their consent and without notice to them without affecting
their liability. The bank which held the note innocently" and -pursuant to an
agreement with a signatory thereto for an extension of the time of payment
drew a line through the due date and inserted a later date. In suit upon
the note brought by the bank held, that the alteration was material and destroyed the note as an obligation despite the stipulation. Caldwell Nat'l Bank
v. Reep (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), 188 S~ W. 507.
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It is well settled! that the alteration of the time of payment made on the
face of a note is ·a material alteration and desti:oys the note as an obligation
if made without the consent of the parties thereto. Stayner v. Joyce, 82 Ind.
35; Stephens v. Graham, 7 Serg. & R. 505; Ives v. Farmers Bank, &J Mass.
236; Bowers v. Rineard, 209 Pa. St. 545, 58 Atl. 912; Master v. Miller, 4 T. R.
320; and that such is the ntle whether the alteration was made innocently
or with fraudulent intent, Green v. Sneed, IOI Ala. 205; Heath v. Blake, 28
N. C. 4o6; Bigelow v. Stephens, 35 Vt. 525; and that this applies to sureties
as well as to principals, Sta3•ner v. Joyce, supra; Ball v. Beaumont, 66 Neb.
56, 92 N. W. I70i Simons & Co. v. McDowell, I25 Ga. 203, 53 S. E. I03I. Although where the consent of the party is expressly or impliedly given, the
alteration does not affect his liability on the note. Wardlow v. List, 4I Oh. St
414; Phillips v. Cripp, lo8 Iowa 6o5, 79 N. W. 373; Schmelz v. Rix, 95 Va.
509. But it is held in accord with the principal case that since the reason.
of the above rule is that such an alteration destroys the identity of the contract, changes its legal effect, and destroys or contradicts the party's memoranda of his original contract, the better rule of interpretation of such
agreements for extension of time is that it contemplates the making of an
agreement additional to that evidenced by the note, and that the party does
not thereby either expressly or impliedly give his consent to any alteration
of the dates of the instrument. The dtte date is held to be essential to the
preservation ~f the note as evidence, and to prevent the substitution of another instrument in its place. Though no~actual injury might result in certain cases yet the inflexibility of the principle is essential to prevent its possibility. Brannum Lumber Co. v. Pickard, 33 Ind. App. 48.J; Stephens v.
Graham, 7 Serg. & R. 505; 2 DANIO., NsG. INSTR., § 1376. Though this rule
would work little or no hardship in those jurisdictions where although the
alteration is held to destroy the note as an obligation yet the party is allowed
to reco~er on the original consideration (Otto v. Haiff, 8g Tex. 384, 34 S. W.
9Io; Booth v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 3I; Jeffrey v. Rosenfeld, 179 Mass. 5o6),
yet whereas in the instant case the due date in the note was not destroyed
or erased but only canceled by a line through it, does not the reason of. preservation of the identity of the instrument for evidence of the original contract fail and thereby render such a holding unduly t~chnical?
·

BILI.S AND Norss-MoR'l'GAGE SscuRJTY AS AFFECTING NEGOTIAllII.ITY.-Below the signature on a promissory note was an endorsement that it was secured by a mortgage on certain real estate which the endorsement described.
The mortgage provided that the mortgagor should pay all taxes, charges, and
assessments on the property, pay the cost of abstract of title and keep all the
buildings insured to a certain value, with a proviso that in case the mortgagor failed to do so, the mortga~ee might and recover the amount paid therefor with 8% interest, for which the mortgage should stand security. In an
action in equity by maker against the holder in due course to cancel the note
and mortgage for fraud in the inducement, the court held )or the defendant
on the ground that the provision in th~ mortgage was merely for the better-
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ment of the security and did not so affect the nature of the debt as to render
the note non-negotiable. L11ndeau v. Hamilton (Iowa, 1916), 159 N. W. 163.
·It is well settled that a note is negotiable even though secured by a mortgage, and by the weight of authority the mere fact that a note itself contains
a reference to such mortgage security endorsed thereon is not sufficient to
destroy its negotiability. Dumas v. Ba11k, r46 Ala. 226, 40 So. g64; Biegler v.
Loan Co., 164 Ill. 197; Zollman v. Ba11k, 238 Ill. 290, 87 N. E. 297; Howry
v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29; Duncan v. Louisville, 76 Ky. 378; Bank v. Crowell,
184 Pa. 284; Bright v. Oldfield, 81 Wash. 442, r43 Pac. 159. The negotiability
of the note is not affected by a recital in the endorsement that the note is
given according to the conditions of the mortgage, where the terms of the
note construed with the mortgage would not impair any essential element of
negotiability. Brooke v. Struthers, no Mich. 562, 68 N. W. 272; Wilson v.
Campbell, IIO Mich. 58o; Thorpe v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149, IOI N. W. n17;
Frost v. Fisher, 13 Colo. App. 332, 58 Pac. 872; Consterdine v. Moore, 65
Neb. 281; Noell v. Gaines, 68 Mo. 649; Owiiigs v. McKenzie, 133 Mo. 323.
But where the mortgage contains provisions which do affect some essential
element of negotiability, the note ,is thereby rendered non-negotiable and the
assignee is subject. to any equities existing in favor of the mortgagor. Myer
v. Weber, 133 Cal. 681, 65 Pac. IIIO; .M cI11tyre v. Yates, 104 Ill. 491; Brooke
v. Struthers, supra; Taylor v. Jones, 165 Cal. 1o8; Allison v. Hol/embeak,
138 Iowa 479, u4 N. W. 1059; Cornish v. Wolverton, 32 Mont. 456, 81 Pac.
4; Trust Co. v. Edgar, 65 Nebr. 301, 91 N. W. 402; Garnett v. Myers, 65
Nebr. 287, 91 N. \V. 400. As the note is given as evidence of the debt and
to fix the terms and times of payment, and the mortgage is simply a pledge
of certain property as security for the payment of the note, the weight of
authority and better reason would seem to support the holding of the principal case;-that provisions in the mortgage which have to do only with the
betterment or preservation of the security do not destroy the negotiability of
the note as they do not affect the note itself but only the mortgage. The
two contracts are to be construed together, but this simply means that provisions in one limiting or explaining those in the other are to be given effect; hence the holder in due course takes free from equities. Thorpe v.
Mindeman, supra; Bank v. Arthur, 163 Iowa 2u, 143 N. W. 556; Consterdine v. Moore, supra; Garnett v. Jiyers, supra; Frost v. Fisher, supra; Hunter v. Clark, supra; Barker v. Satori, 66 \Vash. 26o, II9 Pac. 6u; Former
v. Bank, 8g Ark. 132; Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271. But see, Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah, 231, 49 Pac. 779; Myer v. Weber, supra; Taylor v.
Jones, supra; Briggs v. Crawford, 162 Cal. 124; Cornish v. Wolverton, supra;
National Hdwe. Co. v. Sherwood, 165 Cal. l, 130 Pac. 881; Strong v. Jackson,
123 Mass 6o; Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176; Belmar v. Parsons, 18 Cal.
App. 451, 123 Pac. 356.
CoNsTITU'{IONAL LAw-EFFtCT oF SEvtNTH AMENDMENT ON A~oN UND£R
FEDERAL STATUtt.-The requirement of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution that trial by jury be according to the course of the
common law, i. e., by a unanimous verdict, ,does not control the state courts
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even when enforcing rights under a Federal statute like the Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 148, Comp. Stat. 1913,
§ 8657) and such courts may, tjierefore, give effect to a local practice permitting a less than unanimous verdict. Minn. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. BOm.bolis, 36 Sup. Ct. 595.
It is elementary that the guarantee in the federal constitution that "the
right of trial by jury shall be presen•ed" is guarantee of jury trial as it
was known at the common law. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 18 Sup.
Ct. 62o, 42 L. Ed. 1001. There can be no question as to what the requirements of a jury were at common law. "The law of England hath afforded
the best means of trial that is possible of this and all other matters of fact,
namely, by a jury of twelve men all concurring in the same judgment." l
HAI.I':, P. C. 33. American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464 17 Sup. Ct. 618,
41 L. Ed. 1079; Springville v. Thomas, 166 U. S. 707, 17 Sup. Ct. 717, 41 L.
Ed. II72; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. l, 19 Sup. Ct. 58o, 43 L. Ed.
873. However, the first ten Amendments, including, of course, the seventh,
are not concerned with state action and deal only with Federal action. In
the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, "The constitution was ordained
and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their
own government, and not for the government of the individual states.
The powers they conferred on this government were to· be exercised by
itself; and the limitations on power; if expressed in general terms, are, naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by
the instrument." Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672. See also,
Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 434 12 L. Ed. 213, 223;. Twining v. New Jersey;
.2II U. S. 78, 93, 53 L. Ed. 97, 103. And as a necessary corollary, the seventh amendment applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States,
and does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in
state courts. Edwards v. Elliott, 21 \.\'all. 532, 22 L. Ed. 487. The contention was made, however, by the defendant below that inasmuch as the cause
of action arose under the federal Employers' Liability Act,-in other words,
was Federal in character,-the defendant was by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States entitled to have its liability determined only bY. a unanimous verdict, and not by a five-sixths verdict, permissible under the state statute. Section 6 of the act as amended by Act April
5, 1910 (chap. 143, 36 Stat. at L. 291, Comp. Stat. 1913, 1f 8662) expressly
provides that the state and federal courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
in cases arising under the act. Speaking of the federal Employers' Liability
Act in Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Railroad Co., 223 U.S. l, 32 Sup. Ct.
l6g, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. N_ S. 44, the Supreme Court said, "There is
not here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts, or to control or affect their modes of procedure."
The state courts are therefore at liberty to follow the procedure of their
own forum. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okla. 143, 144 Pac. 1075;
C. & 0. Ry. v. Kelly's Adm., 16I Ky. 655, 171 S. W. 185; C. & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Carnahan, II8 Va. 46, 86 S. E. 863.

a

***
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. CoNsTI'tUTIONAI. LAw-Exm:uTION AGAINST STAT~.-In the original cause
of Virginia v. West Virginia (238 U. S. 202, 59 L. Ed. 1272, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep.
795) a decree was rendered in favor of Virginia and against West Virginia
for $12,393;929.50, the court adjudicating this' amount to be due to the former state as the equitable proportion of the public debt of the original state
of Virginia which was assumed by the State of West Virginia at the time
of its creation as a state. This amount not being paid, the state· of Virginia
prayed for a writ of execution against the state of West Virginia. Held,
the petition should be denied, inasmu!:h as the defendant had no power to
pay the judgment in question e.-ccept through the legislative department of
its government, and the state legislature had not met since the rendition of
the· judgment. Commonwealth of Virginia v. State of West Virginia, 241.
U. S. 531, 36 Sup. Ct. 719.
Counsel for defendant had resisted the granting of the execution on several grounds; among others was the argument' that although the Constitution
imposes upon the Supreme Court the duty, and grants it full pe>wer, to consider controversies between states, and therefore authority to render the
decree in .question, yet with the grant of jurisdiction there was conferred no
authority whatever te> enforce a money judgment against a state if, in the
exercise of jurisdiction, such a judgment was entered. The court, having
denied the execution for the reasons stated in the first paragraph, very
wisely refused to answer the additional arguments that bad been advanced
by defendant's counsel. Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases arising between states. Among
the ~es in whiC:h the Supreme CoUrt has exercised this branch of its original jurisdiction may be cited: South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S.
286, 24 Sup. Ct. 269, ~ L. Ed. 448; Ka~as v. Colorado, 185 U." S. 125, 22
Sup. Ct. 552, 46 L. Ed. 838; Missouri v. Illinois, l8o. U. S. 208, 21 Sup. Ct.
331, 45 L. Ed. 497; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 9 L. Ed. 1233;
New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 284, 8 L. Ed. 127. So far as the records
disclose, the Supreme Court was not called upon in any one of the above
cases to render an execution against the defendant state in order that the
decree might be effectuated. Were this the case where a state had permitted.
itself to be su.ed by some private indivjdual, the judgment would merely
liquidate and establish the claim, and, without an express statutory provision,
could not be collected by execution against the state or· its property. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Chambers, ltig Cal. 131, 145 Pac.
1025; Dabney v. Bank of State, 3 S. C. (3 Rich.) 124 But inasmuch as it is
quite probable that the legislatttre of West Virginia, when it neJ..-t convenes,
will provide for the payment e>f the judgment, it is not expected that the Su'preme Court will find it necessary in order to enforce its decree to determine what action it would pursue in the event that a state refused to pay a
judgment rendered against it.
'
CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAw-STAT~ Rl;GuI.ATION oF Co:MM1':RO: IN INTOXICATING
LIQUORs.-The State of Texas in 1907 imp~sed a tix of $5,ooo.oo annually
on each agency of eyery express company where intoxicating liquors were
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delivered and the price collected on C. O. D. shipments. Held, such a statute is unconstitutional as it imposes a direct burden on interstate co:tnmerce
contrary to the United States Constitution, Art. I, 1f 8, and one which is not
permitted by the Wilson Act of Aug. 8th, 1890 (:26 Stat. at L. 313; Chap.
728, Comp. Stat. 1913, 1f 8738). Rosenberger v. Pacific E~Press Co., 36 Sup.
Ct. 510.
The facts giving rise ·to the case havjng occurred previous to the passage
of the Penal Code enacted by Congress March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. at L. 1136;
Chap. 321, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 10409) the provision thereof which prohibits
common carriers from making interstate shipments of liquor C. 0. D. was
not enforced. For a like reason, the decision was reached without an appli~tion of the .Webb-Kenyon law of March r, 1913 (chap. go, 37 Stat. at I4.
6gg, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8739). ln view.t'of the decision in Rhodes v. Iowa,
170 U. S. 412, 42 L. Ed. lo88, 18 Sup. Ct. 664, emasculating the Wilson .A:ct
of all its virility, except as to a prevention of a sale in the original package,
by holding that the provisions Qf said act were not applicable until a consummation of the shipment had been effected by delivery into the hands of
the consignee, it was to be expected that the court would consider the statute mentioned in the principal case to be a burden on interstate commerce,
inasmuch as it would affect the shipment before delivery to consignee.
CoN'l'RACTs-CoNTINGtNcn:s BtYOND CoNTRoi.-Defendant in a written contract agreed to furnish chemicals for plaintiff. By the terms of the agreement- cancellation was to be permitted in case of "contingencies beyond
control, fire, strikes, accidents to * works or •
stock or change in
the tariff." Defendant failed to comply with the contract, being unable to
secure the goods, owing to the European war which arose subsequent. to the
agreement; defendant claimed this condition constituted a contingency beyond its control within the meaning of the contract. The lower court overruled this contention and defendant appealed. H e?d, that the defendant was
justified in cancelling the contract on the happening of this contingency.
Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Hoffman-La Roche Cimnical Works, 100 N. Y.
Supp. 973.
As a general rule in the construction of contracts, general expressions are
restricted and limited by particular descriptions or recitals following them.
Newport Waterworks v. Taylor, 34 R. J. 478, 83 Atl. 833; Myers et al. v.
Wood et al, 173 Mo. App. 564 158 S. W. 909; Carter v. Chevalier, lo8 Ala.
563; Millerv. Wagenha11scr, 18Mo. App. JI.
In Corzvinv.Hood,5~N. H.401,
the court based· its decision on the ground that there is no absolute rule of
construction, that the enumeration of particular terms after a general e..'Cpression excludes other terms which mi11:ht rea.~onably be included in the general
expression. The principal case considers the real intention of the parties
in using general and particular expressions and is in accord with Jewel Tea
Co. v. Watkins, z6 Colo. App. 494, 145 Pac. 719; Keiser v. Reading Suburban
Real Estate Co., 43 Pa. Sup. Ct. 130; Verbeck v. Petets, 176 Ia. 610, 153
N. W. 215; Taylor v. Buffalo Collieries Co., 72 W. Va. 353, 79 S. E. 27.

* *
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CoN'.tRAC'.l's-SA'rIS!!ACTORY Pn&oR:YANct.-Plaintiff entered into a contract
to paint defendant's house, guaranteeing performance in a workmanlike manner and to the entire satisfaction of defendant. The materials used were
of the best quality and the work was done in a workmanlike manner, but
defendant was dissatisfied with the spotted appearance of the house, which
gradually increased after the job was completed. In a suit for the agreed
price, defendant's counsel moved for a directed verdict on the ground that
the evidence did· not show satisfaction on the part of the defendant. This
was refused and the case submitted to the jury on the instruction that the
verdict should turn on whether or not the work was well done and a rea.Sonable man would be satisfied. Held, that the submission to the jury was proper. Miller v. Phillips (R. I. 1916), 98 Atl. 59.
Apparently there is a decided conflict in the decisions of the various courts
which have been called upon to decide whether or not the contracting party
shall be the sole judge of the question of satisfaction. The tendency of the
courts in the more recent "decisions seems to be in harmony with the reasoning in tl).e principal case. Waite v. Shoemaker & Co., 50 Mont. 264 146 Pac.
736; Gladding, Mc Bea1i & Co. v. Montgomery, 20 Cal. App. 276, 128 Pac.
790; Hawken v. Daley, 85 Conn. 16, 81 Atl. 1053; Hopkins v. ~aham, 149,
Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312; Keeler v. Clifford, 62 Ill. App. 64- In a large group
of eases the courts allow the contracting party to decide whether or not the
work done or article manufactured is satisfactory as a condition precedent
to the other ·party~ right to recover, if the object of the contract is to gratify" personal. taste or serve personal convenience.· Barnett v. Beggs, 208 Fed.
255; Schan& v. landorf, 175 Mich. 88, 140 N. W. 996; Hanaford
Stevens
& Co. (R. I •. 1916), ~ "Atl. 209; Haveii v. Russell, 34 N. Y. Supp. 292; Moore
v. Goodwin, 43 Hun. 534; Saleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 26 Am. Rep. 446;
Hausding v. Soloman, 127 Mich. 654 There are some cases whi-ch are ap-·
parently in conflict with the reasoning of the principal case. McCarren v.
McNulty, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 139; Koehler v. Buhl, 94 Mich. 496; £;haust
Ventilator Co. v. Chicago, et~. R. Co., 66 Wis. 218. ·Whether or not a reasonable man would be Batisfied under the circumstances is not considered and
the ·absolute right of the party to determine the question is reeognized. In
many of these cases the same result could be obtained by applying the rule
. followc;d in those. cases which refu_se to allow the promisee to question the
ground of decision on the part of the promisor when the fancy, taste, or
personal judgment of the promisor are involved. .

v.

, CoJU>ORA'l'Io~s-AC'l'IoN AGAINS'l' FoRF.IGN Colll'ORATION Dome Bus1m:ss IN.
S'l'A'l'S W1'rHOU'r LictNSS.--§ 1753 of the Statute9 provided that all issuance . by" the corporation of corporate stock below par should be void.
§ 177ob (10) declared that all foreign corporations doing business in the state
were amenable to the same restrictions ·as domestic corporations. It was
also provided that foreign corporations wishing to do busine&s in the· state
should register and pay a license fee. The plaintiff seeks on the ground of
fraud to recover the money he paid: for stock in the defendant corporation,
incorporated in another state and not licensed to do business in Wisconsin,
'l'H~
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this stock being paid for at considerably below par. Held, that the sale was
a nullity, that the foreign corporation was subject to the statutes affecting
domestic corporations though it had never taken out a license, that tlie statute expressed a rule of public policy which would be applied by the court
even if invoked: by neither parcy, and that the result was that the court
would interfere to aid neith~r. Thronson v. Universal Mfg. Co. (Wis. 1916),
159 N. W. 575.
.
It is held almost universally that all foreign corporatio~xcept those
which are of religious or charitable nature, or are engaged in commerce,
interstate or foreign, or are
the employ of the federal government-are
subject to the statutes of the state in which. they transact business. But as
to the effect of failure to observe the requirements of the statutes there is
an almost infinite variety of holdings. Thus it is held that violation of the
statute makes a contract void. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Mullett, 245 Mo. 168; .
Hunter W. Finch & Co. v. Zenith Furnace Co., 245 Ill. 586. That it is enforceable against the corporation, Gaul v. Keil & Arthe Co., 199 N. Y. 472;
Davia Luptoirs Sons Co. v. Automobile Club, 225 U. S. 489; Clifford v. Hedrick, 159 Ilt App. 63; Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites, 204 N. Y. 231.
That it is enforceable by the corporation, Model Heating Co. v: M agarity,
(Del. 19u), 81 Atl. 394- The present case follows the view that such contracts are void. · The law of the various states, and often even in the same
state, is in chaotic condition on this point and the result is hardship on foreign corporations and on everyone dealing with. them. The object of such
statutes .is always to protect the citizens of the state and domestic corporations from unfair competition, and from the necessity of suing foreign corporations in the state in which they wei:e incorporated and under its laws.
By such decisions as those in the present case the object of the statute is
defeated by the very court which declares the statute to be based on public
policy, and the rights of both citizen and foreign corporation are left unpro-:
tected.

m

CoRPORA'l'IONS-CoRPORATION Acr:NT NOT Rr:Gxs'tr;R:S> UNDER "Bx.tm Sia!
!,Aw" IS D.s FACTO OFFIC:ER AS TO THIRD PARTits.-The plaintiff paid money
to an agent of the defendant corporation, who was not registered as required by the "Blue Sky Law" (Public Acts, 1913, No. 143.). The agent
absconded with the money and the plaintiff seeks to recover from the corporation the amount he had paid for the stock, which its officers had refused
to deliver. Held, that if the agent..acted in the name of the president of the
-corporation, who was registered, the sale was lawful, insofar as binding the
corporation was concerned. De Hoop v. Peninsular Life Insurance Co.
(Mich. 1916), 159 N. W. 500.
The defendants had registered under the Act of 1913 (declared unconsti·
tutional in 210 Fed. 173 and repealed in 1915) and there is no question of
iheir right to sell stock. The point raised was that the agent, Brown, was
not registered and that the sale by him was therefore a nullity. But the
court was "not impressed that the ghost of that act (Act of 1913) yet walks
in aid of those who seek to benefit by their failure to observe it when osten-
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sibly in being." The-plaintiff was then a third party and to him the agent
was a de facto officer of the corporation. Sherwood v. Wallin, 154 Cal. 735;
Scanlan v. Snow, 2 App. D: C. 137; Mechanics' National Bank v. H. C. Burnett Mfg. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 236; State ex rel Bornej'eld v. Kupferle, 44 Mo.
154; Brown v. Crown Gold Milling Co.; 150 Cal. 376, 8g Pac. 86; Umatilla
Water Users' Ass'n. v. Irvin, 56 Ore. 414, lo8 Pac. 1016; Lewis v. Matthews,
146 N. Y. Supp. 424; but see contra Exline-Reimers Co. v. Lone Star Insurance Co. (Tex. 1914), r7i: S. W. 106o. Moreover the corporation, having
profited extensively from the unregistered activities of Brown as their agent,
and having consistently held him out as such, is estopped from alleging th'e
illegality· of his appointment in co11atera1 proceedings. Walker v. Detroit
·· Transit Railway, 47 Mich. 338; Fl;i,inn v. Des Moines & St. Louis Ry. Co.,
63 Ia. 490; A. T. & G. R-: Co. v. Kittel, 52 Fed. 63; Merchants' National Bank
v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 159 Mass. 505. For excellent short discussions
of the subject see Umatilla Water Users' Ass'n v. Irvin, supra, :ind 16 Cor..

L.

~v.405.

CoRPORA'l'IONS-RlGHT oF Sou:

SH~HOI.DtR TO

Co:Mt

IN

ON PARITY WITH

GiiNntAI. CluwITORS.-Plaintiffs were the sole shareholders in the insolvent
corporation, and the partnership of which the plaintiffs were the only members had operated as tlie exclusive selling agency of the products of the
corporation, on a profit-sharing agreement. Nevertheless there was no con- ·
cealment of the existent relations, and there was no identity between the
three. Held, in suit in equity to wind up the corporation, that claims of the
· . pl!ljntiff;, based on note5 given for moner advanced, and partly secur~d by
collateral, should come in on an equality with the claims of general creditors.
Pe~kett et al v. Wood et at, (C. C. A. 1916), 234 Fed. 833.
Tllis case i"s a pec'uliar one when analyzed on the fact&. The controversy·
has been heretofore as to whether directors, other officers or shareholders
had the right to prefer their own claims, based on money advanced to keep
the "now insolvent corporation running, to those of the general creditors. The
weight of authority seems to be against a11owing such preferences, but there
is a strolig line of authority to the contrary, and in a number of states statut~ have been passed to forbid them. See Cr.ARK & MARSHAI.L, §§ 787-788,
aha COOK, § 6g2 and eases cited therein. For recent case under statute see
Pennsy1va11ia R. 1Co. v. Peddrick et al (D. C. 1916), 234 Fed. 781. But in"
tlie present case the general creditors do not merely seek to preserve their
claims on a parity with those of the· shareholders ; they endeavor to have
their own claims preferred. They make no showing of fraud, or that they
relied on. the peculiar relationship of the shareholders, their partnership, and
the corporanon, -0r that there was any actual identity between the corP<>ration and its sole shareholders. Their claim seems to rest on the bare fact
that the plaintiffs were sole shareholders. The case, we believe, is unique,
ilnci marks the highwaler point in the reaction against the allowance of preferences of the claims of officers and shareholders.
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CRIMINAi, LAVI-RA~ BY FRAUDUI.l':N'l' MARRJAGt.-Defendant was convicted of rape under a statute providing that an act of sexual intercourse
is rape when accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator,
"where she submits under the belief that the person committing the act is
her husband, and the belief is induced by artifice, pretense, or concealment
practiced by the accused, or by the accused in collusion with her husband,
with intent to induce such belief." The accused and prosecutrix had participated in a marriage ceremony which, unknown· to prosecutrix, was a shani,
and had lived together as husband and wife for over three years when the
accused abandoned the prosecutiix and 'married' another woman. Held, not
guilty of rape, but prosecution recommended on a charge ~f bigamy. Drau.qhn
v. State (Okla.), 158 Pac. 8go.
•
'
·
The decision is put upon two grounds: :first, that.~ conunon-law marriage
was consummated, so that the defendant was .in fact the prosecutrix's husband; second, that the statute was designed ~hly to protect a married woman against deception as to the identity of the man with whom she has intercourse. Courts might differ as to whether a valid common law marriage
had been consummated but the decision on that point commands approval.
Granted that there was a valid marriage, it was unnecessary to construe th~
statute ut supra. If, however, it should be determined in any case that no
marriage had resulted from the acts of the parties, then the comitruction
of the statute would become important. In Wilkerson v. State, 6o Texas
Crim. Rep. 388, 131 S. W. no8, Ann. Cases l912C 126, it was held that a
married man who had induced a single woman to have intercourse with him
as the result of a sham marriage was guilty of rape under a similar statute,
.the fact that he was legally ·married when the act was committed! preventing
the transactions from raising a common law marriage. And in Lee v. State,
44 Tex, Crim. Rep. 354 72 S. W. 1005, 61 L. R. A. 904' it was held, under
the same statute, that a single man: who induced intercourse by means of a
sham marriage and who married another woman nine months later was
guilty of rape, the court holding that there was no common law marriage
under all the circumstances of the case. With reference to the construction
of the statute, the court say, ''This court would not be authorized in holding
that the woman upon whom the fraud is practiced, in order to secure her
consent to an act of copulation, must be a married woman in every instance.
This would be a strained construction; in fact would not be a construction
at all, but an interpolation upon the statutes. This is not warranted in construing any law. Nor can we say that the legislature intended to permit
fraud practiced upon a single woman not to be rape when the same fraud
would be rape if practiced upon a· married woman. If the fraud is such as
to cause the woman, whether legally married or· unmarried, to give consent
to the act of copulation, believing she is the wife of the man she is copulating with, it is nevertheless rape whether the woman be married or single."
The basic reason for allowing fraud to vitiate consent in any case is well
expressed thus, "The outrage upon the woman and the injury to society is
just as great in these cases as if ac~al force had been employed; and vye
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have been unable to satisfy ourselves that the act can be said to be any less
against the will of the woman, than :when it is extorted by threats or
force." Judge Coor.i;y in Crosswell v. People, 13 Mich. 427. The only argument advanced in the principal case in support of the interpretation put
upon the statute is based upon the use of the words, "or by the accused
in co11usion with her husband." But this argument involves the unwarranted assumption that the legislature could not or would not, in one statute,
throw over the two classes of women its protection against the two related
forms of wrong. Given that assumption, the clause in question shows that
the legislature was dealing with married women, and hence not with unmarried women.. But; discarding that assumption, the clause means nothing
but the familiar abundance of caution. In view of the inherent unsoundness
of the ruling in the principal case, and in view of the fact that it was unnecessary to the disposition of the case, it is entitled to very tittle weight
as an authority.
·
DAMAG~MIS'.l.'AKS IN TRANSMI'.l.".l.'ING T!LllGRAM.-Paintiff sent a message
offering to buy cotton seed at.$20.00, but the telegraph company delivered to
the addressee a messsage offering to buy at $22.oo. The addressee placed
the seed in cars for delivery. Plaintiff, after discovering mistake, paid for
the amount contract~ for at $22.oo and brought iiuit against the defendant
company, claiming, as damages the excess of $2.oo per ton. H.eld, plaintiff
was only entitled· to nominal damages or amount tendered therefore by defendant, to-wit, 41 cents. Mt. Gilead' Cotton Oil Cc>. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (N. C. 1916), 8g S. E. 21.
The court· in this case relied on Pegram v. Telegraph Co., loo N. C. 28,
·6 S. E. 770, 6 Am. St. Rep. 557, in which case the court stated that the telegraph con;ipany was not the agent of the sender and the latter was not
bound by the terms of a telegram in which a material alteration was made
through the negligence of the company. FoUowing such reasoning, the plaintiff in the principal case was not bound to accept the seed at $22.oo and ought
not to recover the excess as damages. This doctrine is supported by_ Pepper
v. Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554 II S. W. 783, 4 L. R. A. 66o, JO Am. St. Rep. 669;
Shingleur v. Tel. Cn., 72 Miss. 1030, 18 So. 425, 30 I,. R. A. 444. 48 Am. St.
Rep. 6o4; Strong v. Tel. Co., 18 Ida. 389, 109 Pac. 910, 30 L R. A. N. S. 409,
Ann. Cas. 1912A 55; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Shaefer etc., no Ky. 907; Postal Tel. Co. v. Akron Cereal Co., 23 Oh. Cir. Ct. Rep. 516. A Canadian case,
. Lane v. Montreal Tel. Co., 7 U. C. C. P. 23, is also in accord with the prinCipal case. In Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495, the
court upheld the view that the company-was the agent of the sender and
since the latter chose this means of communication he was liable to the
addressee who accepted the offer as altered by the company. This seems
to be the weight of authority in the United States. Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Victor G. Bloede Co., 127 Md. 344, g6 Atl. 685; Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Shatter, 71 Ga. 700: Western Uniqn Tel. Co. v. Flint River Lumber Co.,
n4 Ga. 576, 88 Am. $t. Rep. 36, 40 S. E. 815; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Lathorp, 131 111. 575; Fisher v. W. Union Tel. Co., II9 Ky. 88s; Ashford v.
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Schoop, 81 Mo. App. 539; Saveland v Green, 40 Wis. 431; Washington &c.
Tel. Co. v. Hobson, 15 Gratt. 122; T~,iler v. Western Union Tel. Co., 6o Ill
421, 12 Am. Rep. 38; Haubelt Brothers v. Rea & Page Mill Co., 77 :Mo. 4-PP·

672.
EsTA'l'tS-:lli:VISE OF CONTINGENT REMAINDER.-A. M. M. by deed conveyed
property to his brother A. J. M. in trust to pay the income therefrom to
A. M. M. for life, and should A. M. M. leave children or grandchildren, the
principal to go to them at A. M. M.'s death, but should A. M. M. die :with·
out child or grandchiJd living, then to A. J. M. in fee. A. J. M. died in
1894 after having made a will wherein (after· having made some minor bequests), he devised all the rest and residue of his estate, "whether in possession, remainder, or reversion, or in expectancy'' to his wife. A. M. M.
died in 1915 without child or grandchild. Held, the contingent remainder in
A. J.M. passe!f by his will, though he died before the contingency happened.
Myers v. McClurg (Md. 1916), 98 Atl. 491.
From the cases cited in argument of the principal case it seems that attor-neys often fail to distinguish between .contingent remainders where the person to take is uncertain and contingent remainders where the event is uncertain. L'Armour v. Rich, 71 Md. 369, 18 Atl. 702; Cherbonnier v. Goodwin, 79 Md. 55, 28 Atl. 894. Where the person is uncertain, as in a gift to
A with remainders to such children of A as should be living at a definite
future day, it has been held that no one of A's children before that day
should have a devisable interest Doe d. Calkin v. Tomkinson, 2 M. & S. 165,
105 Eng. Rep. 344. an early case, followed by the niajorlty of courts in this
country, which following Jones v. Roe, 3 T. R. 88, l H. Bl. 30, 100 Eng. Rep.
470, 126 Eng. Rep. 20 have allowed · a contingent remainder-man to devise
his remainder when the uncertainty was as to the event· and not as to the
person." Morse v. Proper, 82 Ga: 13, 8 S. E. 625; Collins v. Smith, 105 Ga.
525, 31 S. E. 449; letlkins v. Bonsal, n6 Md. 629, 82 Atl. 229; Ingilby v. Amcotts, 21 Beav. 585; Loring v. Arnold, IS R. I. 428, 8 Atl. 335;.Clark v. Cox,
IIS N. C. 93, 20 S. E. 176; Ken3•on v. See, 94 ~. Y. 563; Barnitz v. Casey,
7 Cranch 469, 3 L. Ed. 403; Winslow v. Goodwin, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 363.
Some courts, however, have failed to distinguish between the two sorts of
cases and have held that a contingent remainder is devisable though it is
uncertain as to the person who is to take. Rembert v. Evans, 86 S. C. 445,
68 S. E. 659; Allen v. Watts, g8 Ala. 384, I I So. 646; Yo11ng v. Young, 8g
Va. 675, 23 L. R. A. 642 (dictumh Provided, of course, that if the event
upon which the contingent estate was to vest never happens and becomes
impossible of happening, any attempt that has been made to devise it is
without force or effect. Eckle v. R)•land, 256 Mo. 424. 165 S. W. 1035. See
article in 9 Col. L. Rev. 546.
EVID1':NCE-EFFECT OF HEARSAY UNDJ;R WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATJON ACT.Plaintiff sued under the Workmen's Compensation Act to recover for the
death of her intestate, an ice~wagon driver employed by defendant company.
Plaintiff claimed that the death result~d from injuries received by decedent
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when a heavy cake of ice slipped and fell on him when he was unloading
it, from his wagon; three witnesses for defendant testified that they were
present at the time and place of the alleged accident, and that no such accident happened to decedent; the only evidence to support plaintiff's version
was ~e testimony of plaintiff herself, a physician, and one other person, to
the effect that dec;,edent had told them that he was injured in the manner
claimed by plaintiff. The Workmen's Compensation Commission made an
award for plaintiff based on this hearsay testimony, which it considered to
· be admissible under § 68 of the Compensation Act. providing that the Commission "shall not be bound 'by common law or statutory rules of evidence
but shall conduct its hearings "in such manner as to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties." The award was sustained in the Supreme
Court (16g ~pp. Div. 450, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1) and defendant company appealed to the Court of Appeals. Held, (S!WIURY and PouNn, JJ. dissenting)
that while hearsay evidence is clearly admissible under § 68, the only "substantial evideni:e" before the Commission was the testimony of defendant's
witnesses t,o the effect that there was no such accident as was claimed by
plaintiff; that under the circumstances the evidence as to decedent's declarations was no evidence, and that the claim for compensation should accordingly be dismissed. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (N. Y. 1916), n3 N. E.
507.
F6r a discussion of the principles. involved in this case, see comment on
the. decision of the same case in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
in 14 MlcH. L. Rm'. ls8. ·

* * *"

Evmi.;N~-VAl.~ oF CRoP Dts'tllon:» BY H4JL.-Plaintitr.s crops were insured with defendant company against loss by hail. Plaintiff's small grain
was about ten inches high and the com about six inches high when the hail
injured it. Evidepce of the crop yield in the neighboring fields was held
to be ;idmissible to establish the amount of loss, there being also evidence
that the conditions there were practically the same before loss. Stockwell
v. German Mut. Ins. Assn. of LeJfars (S. D. 1916), 158 N. W. 450.,
The method of proof of loss on growi~g crops is in a state of confusion.
One line of cases holds that witnesses, usually farmers especially conversant
with the crop-producing qualities of the particular ,locality in question, will
be allowed to give their opinion as to the value of the matured crop of the
field in question, basing such opinion on the usual yield of the land in seasons similar to that in which the loss occurred. Railway Company v. Lyman,
57 Ark. 512, 22 S. W. 170'; and St. Louis et R.R. Co. v. Yarborough, 56 Ark.
612, 20 S. W. 515; S{J-yers v. M. P. R. Co., 82 Kan. 123, 107 Pac. 641, 27
L. R. A. N. S. 168. Another line of cases decides the amount of loss entirely
upon opinion evidence of so-called expert witnesses, laying down no particular method by which they are to reach their conclusions, but leaving it
entirely to the witness to estimate the probable yield had no loss occurred,
without stating the foundations of his estimate. These cases go upon the
theory that it is a situation that cannot be so adequately described by a wit
ness that a jury could draw an· intelligent conclusion, hence allow opinion
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evidence. Chicago, Burli11gton, etc. R. R. Co. v. Schaeffer, 26 Ill. App. 28o;
Otowa v. Graham, 35 Ill. 346; G. & S. E. R.R. Cl). v. Haslam, 73 Ill. 494;
C. & St. L. R.R. Co. v. Woosley, 85 Ill. 370. The third line of decisions is
in agreement with the instant case, holding that the yield of an uninjured
part of the field destroyed, or the yield of neighboring fields produced under
approximately similar conditions, may be made the. basis. of .Proof of lo~s.
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. McGowan, 73 Tex. 355, I I S. W. 336;
Ethridge v. San Antonio etc. R~,i. Co. (Tex. Civil App.), 39 S. W. 204;
Adams v. Stadler, 78 Ill. App. 4~2; Teller v. Bay & River Dredging Company, 151 Cal. 209, 90 Pac. 942, 12 L. R. A. N. S. 267, 12 Ann. Cas. 779; Shoemaker v. Acker, n(j Cal. 239, 48 Pac. 62. JoN:es, Evmr:NCE, .§ 384; International Agricultural Corporation v. Abercrombie, 184 Ala. 244. 63 So. 549, and
note in 49 L. R. A. N. S. 415; Barry v. Farmers 1\futual Hail Ins. Co., no
Ia. 433, 81 N. W. 6go; Condon v. Des Moines Mutual Flail bis. Assn., 120
Ia. 8o, 94 N. W. 477.
.
Evm:eNc£-WIF1~ ·As WITN:ess AGAINST HusBAN~ IN PRos:ecuTION FOR lNc:esT.-Defendant was prosecuted for incest and his wife was allowed to testify against him over his objection. The Iowa Statute (§ 46o6) provided that
"neither the husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other,
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed one again"st the
other. * * *" Held, that a wife is a competent· witness against her husband
in a prosecution for incest, as incest committed by the husband is a crime
committed against the wife, and hence is within the exception to the statutory prohibition. State v. Schultz (Iowa· 1916), 158 N. W. 539.
The court cites one case which sustains its ruling-State v. Chambers, 87
Iowa I, 53 N. W. 1090, 43 Am. St. Rep. 349, which seems to be the only case
thus decided on this exact point. The Iowa court has also held that adultery and bigamy are crimes against the innocent spouse making such spouse
competent as a witness. State v. Bennett, 31 Iowa 24; State v. Sloan., 55
Iowa 217. The weight of authority is, however, against the Iowa cases: as
to incest (State v. Burt, 17 S. D. 7, 94 N. W. 409, 62 L. R. A. I72, 1o6 Am.
St. Rep. 759; Compton v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 271, 44 Am. Rep. 703) ;
as to adultery (State v. Vollander, 57 Minn. 225, 58 N. W. 878; People v.
Imes, no Mich. 250, 68 N, W. 157; Comm. v. Sparks, 7 Allen 534) and as to
bigamy (People v. Quanstrom, 93 Mich. 254, 53 N. W. 165, 17 L. R. A. 723;
Hiler v. People, 156 Ill. 5n, 41 N. E. 181, 47 Am. St. Rep. 221). In Compton
v. State, supra, the Te.""Cas court ov:erruled two earlier Texas cases (Morrill
v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 447 and Roland v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. App. 277) which
had held that adultery was a crime against a spouse so as to make such
spouse a competent witness under a like statute. In Basset v. United States,
137 U. S. 496, it was held that a wife could not testify against her husband
who was prosecuted for polygamy. In State v. Woodrow, 58 W. Va. 527,
52 S. E. 545, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 862, defendant shot at his wife, wounding her
and killing her child which she held in her arms; his conviction for murdering the child was reversed because of the admission of the wife's testimony,
the court holding that the killing of the child was not a crime against the
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wife, but admitting, of course, that the wife could properly have testified on
the trial of the husband for wounding the wife. Bigamy was held to be
such a crime against the wife as to permit her to testify against her husband
in Hill v. State, 61 Neb. 58g, 57 L. R. A. 155, 85 N. W. 836, but the weight
of authority seems clearly opposed to the Iowa court in its view that cases
of this nature are within the exceptions to the general rule that one spouse
cannot testify against the other.
HusBAND AND W1n:-INSURANCS FROM AN EsTA'.m BY EN~s.-Husband
and wife were possessed, as tenants in entirety, of a leasehold property
upon which an insured house had burned down. The wife brought a bill
in equity for a decree that the insurance money, deposited in their names
jointly might be used tQ rebuild the house. Held, that the proceeds of insurance from an estate by entireties was not subject to the control of the
husband but was held by entireties and should be laid out in rebuilding, if
·feasible, Masterman v. Masterman (Md. 1916), 98 Atl. 537.
Some courts do not recognize tenancies by entireties in personalty. Abshire v. State, 53 Ind. 66; Fogleman v. Shively, 4 Incl App. 197; Matter of
Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 9r. The contrary view is usually taken however. Estates,hy entireties may be created by the purchase of personalty, usually
choses in action, with the wife's :inoney alone or the husband's alone and
taken ,in their joint names; or by a gift or devise of personalty to both;
or ,may arise in money or choses in action coming from parting with real
estate held by entireties •. At common law the husband would be entitled
during his life to the use, control, and the profits of personalty held by entireties.· Sanford v. Sanford, 45 'N. Y. 723. Under the Married Woman's
Acts the situation is more puzzling. Some states hold that these Acts have
abolished tenancies by entireties, Donegan v. Donegan, 103 Ala. 488. Where
the bonCl, promissory note or other personalty is purchased with either the
wife's or husband's money alone and title is taken jointly, they are said to
hold it by entireties for it is assumed that the party ihtended a gift of the
property in case of surviyal. Parry's Estate, 88 Pa. St. 33; Fiedler v. Howard, 99 Wis. 388. Where the husband and wife each furnished part of the
purchase price it is generally held that no estate by entireties is created because it is assumed that no gift of the property upon survival was intended.
Johnson v. Johnson, 173 Mo. 91. In the case of a devise or"gift of personalty
to the husband
wife, Phelps v. Simons, 159 Mass. 415, holds that an estate
by entireties is thereby created. Money or securities coming from parting
with or -selling real estate held by entireties is also held by entireties. Bramberry's Estate, x56 Pa. St. 628; Allen v. Tate, 58 Miss. 583; Boland
Mc.:.
Koweii, 18g Mass. 563. The principal case falls under this subdivision. The
fire insurance money was as much part of the proceeds of the property as
if the house had been sold, and was not subject to the control of the husband but was still held by entireties, and the house should be rebuilt with it.
The proceeds arising from sale of an estate by entireties must be distinguished from the income or rents and profits of such an estate, for they are
usually held, under modern statutes, to belong to husband and wife ·in com-
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mon. Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 386 though in' some states, as in Michigan,
such rents and profits cannot be subjected to claims of creditors of either.
Dickey v. Converse, u7 Mich. 449.
HUSBAND AND W~-NJ;C£SS;\RUS FuRmsH!lD ~ BIGAMOUS \VI~.-Wr
though she had a husband living, had gone through a marriage ceremony
with H, and had lived with him as his wife. H discovered the deception that
had been practiced on him and was .about to institute a prosecution for bigamy against W, when she .fled, but before absconding she bought necessaries.
on H's credit. Held, that H is liable even ·though his purported marriage
with W was void. Frank v. Carter (N. Y. 1916), n3 ·N. E. 549.
It is usually said that the husband'g liability for necessaries ~urnished the
wife arises out of the duty imposed by the marriage relation and it must be
shown that the goods were necessaries and that he has failed to furnish
them. Bergh-v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250. The.husband is always liabie where
a real agency can be implied, as from the fact that he has previously paid
for goods furnished his wife on his credit. Benjamin v. Be~zjamifi, 15 Conn.
347. A third case of liabilitY arises when goods h.ave been furnished a woman to whom the defendant has never been married but whom be has ·held
out as his wife. · The liability there cann,ot ·be based upon the duty arising
from the marriage relation and it exists even though there is no real agency.
Most courts base it upon an estoppel. Watson Y. Threlkeld, 2 Esp. ()37;
Hoyle v. Warfield, 28 IIL App. 628. In Ryan v. Sams, 12 Ad. & El. 46o, and
Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 172, an agency could be impli~ from the facts and
the court did not rest the. decisi~n entirely on the estoppeL Watson v. Threlkeld, supra carries the doctrine of estoppel the farthest for it holds the defendant liable even though the plaintiff knew he (the defendant) was not
married to the woman to whom the goods were furnished. Munro v. De
Chamant, 4 Camp. 215 ho1ds that the liability of the rpan for necessaries
ceases at the time of the separation from the woman he has held out as his
wife. Where a marriage cerem9ny has in fact taken place (though· void
because of bigl\"'lY of the wife as in Frank v. Carter supra) the doctrine of
estoppel is appl\·.d also. The husband is estopped to assert that the woman
is not his wife and he will be held liable for goods sold her even after separation, provided the plaintiff did not know of the separation. Hawley v.
Ham, Taylor (Ont.) 385; Johnson v. Allen, 8 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 5o6. A
fortiori the husband will be liable when he attempts to set up his own bigamy as a defense, Robinson v. Nahon, I Camp. 245.

LANDU>RD AND T£NANT-CoV£NANT roR QUI£T ENJOY111£NT.-Plaintiff sued
his lessor on a covenant for quiet enjoyment. It was proved that other tenants of defendant caused a nuisance which injured plaintiff's business. Held,
that defendant is not liable in the absence of proof that be authorized or
participated in the nuisance. Malzy v. Eichholz [1916], 2 K. B. 3o8.
The covenant stipulated that the lessee's quiet enjoyment should not be
disturbed by the lessor ol" anyone claiming through him. It is the law in
England and the United States that there is no liability on such a covenant
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unless the alleged breach results from the lessor's own act, or some act
authorized by hiID; Harrison, Ainslie & Co. v. Muncaster [18g1], 2 Q. B.
68o; Sanderson v. Berwick-011rTweed Corporation (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 547;
Jeffreys v. Evans, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 246; Jaeger v. Mansions Consolidated
(1903), 87 L. T. 6go; Gilhoo/ey v. Washington, 4 N. Y. 217; De Witt v. Pierson, II2 Mass. 8. In this country eviction is necessary to support an action
on a covenant for q~iet enjoyment, whether in a lease.or a deed, Borcel v.
Lawton., 90 N. Y. 293, 43 Am. Dec. .170; Avery v. Doflgherty, 102 Ind. 443;
Callahan v. Goldman; 216 Mass. 238, 103 N. E. 68g; Roth v. Adams, 185 Mass.
341, 70 N. E. 445; American Ice Co. v. Pocano Spring C.o., 183 Fed. I93· In
some jurisdictions, if the act of the landlord is such as to substantially de.. prive the lessee of the consideration which he should receive for his payment
of rent he may recover under the. covenant, on the theory of a constructive
eviction, Pendleton v. D;tett, 8 Cowen (N. Y.), 727; Spragfle v. Baker, Ii
Mass. 586; Brown v. Hol3•oke Water Power Co., I52 Mass. 463, 25 N. E. g66;
but there can be no constructive eviction unless the lessee actually leaves the
premises, Barrett v. Boddie, I58 Ill. 479; Dewitt v. Pierson, supra; Hoberg
v. Mar;, I53 Pa. St 216; and the abandonment must take place within a reasonable time, Crommelin v. Thiers, 3I Ala. 412, 70 Am. Dec. 499. The older
English cases indicate that the early rule in that jurisdiction required proof
of eviction as a basis of recovery on the covenant, Dennett v. Atherton, L. R.
7 Q. B. 3I6; Upton v. Townsend, rj C. B. 30, 84 E. C. L. Rep. 30. Later
cases, however, give the covenant a wider scope, holding that it may be'
broken although neither the title nor .Possession are affected, the true question being, according to these authorities, whether or not there has been a
substantial interference with the ordinary and lawful enjoyment of the tenant, and this to be determined by a jtiry, ·StJnderson v. Berwick-on-Tweed
Corp., supra, Bt4dd-Scott v. Caniell [1902], 2 K B. 35I; Ma11chester Ry. v.
Anderson [I8g8], 2 Ch. 394; Williams v. Gabriel [Igo6], l K. B. I55- The
more liberal construction which these courts are now making of the covenant
when contained in a lease seems highly proper.
MqNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR NllGt.lG£N~-PUBt.lC PARKS.Plaintiff, a four-year-old child, was bitten by a coyote negligently kept in a
wire cage in a public park maintained by the city. Held, ·maintenance of
parks is a governmental function, in the performance of which the city is
not liable for the negligence of its agents or servants. Hibbard v. City of
Wichita (Kans. I9I6), 159 Pac. 399.
It is a settled principle that, with one or two well recognized exceptions,
a municipality is not liable for the negligence of its servants or agents in the
performance of governmental functions, as distinguished from municipal
functions. There is less uniformity as to· what functions are properly classed
as governmental. Most courts, when the question has arisen, have held, as in
the principal case, that the maintenance of public parks is a governmental
function, not within any exception to the rule of exemption from liability,
and therefore that a city is not liable for injuries caused by negligence in
the operation and management of parks, unless such liability is expressly
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imposed by statute. Board of Park Commissioners Y. Prin111 127 Ky. 46o;
Harper v. City of Topeka, 92 Kan. n, 51 L. R. A. N. S. 1032; Masor &c v.
Burns, 131 Tenn. 281; Blair v. Granger, 24 R. I. 17; Russell v. Tacoma, 8
Wash. 156; Brisbing v. Asbury Park, 8o N. J. L. 416, 33 L. R. A. N. S. s23;
Steele v. City of Boston, 128 Mass. 583; Clark v. Waltham, 128 Mass. 567.
See also Higginson v. Treas. etc. of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 24 Cent. L. J. 463.
It has been held in some cases, however, that the maintenance of parks is
not necessarily a governmental function, and that the city is liable for negti-.
gence in their management. Jones v. City of New Havet~, 34 Conn. 1; City
of Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 Pac. 590, 2 L. R. A. N. S. r47. And
see Board of P.ark Commissioners v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; Gartland v. Ne--c.U
York Zoological Societ~•, 135 App. Div. (N. Y.) 163; and State v. Schweickard#, 109 Mo. 4g6, 512, in support of this doctrine. There is some tendency
to apply a rule of natural justice rather than strict logic to cases of injuries
caused by the negligence of municipal officers and servants, and many courts
have held the city liable in cases of this kind, either by putting the case
within some exception to the rule of exemption from liability (Ackeret v.
City of Minneapolis, 129 Minn. 190, 151 N. W. 976; Capp v. St. J,ouis, 251
Mo. 345, 158 S.
616) or by applying rules applicable to private individuals, without regard to whether the maintenance of parks is .governmental or
not (Glase v. City of Philadelphia, 16g Pa. 488, 32 Atl. 6oo; Carey v. Kaflsas
City, 187 Mo. 715; Weber v. Hiz"isburg, 216 Pa. n7, 64 Atl. 905; Silverman
v. City of JVew York, n4 N. Y. Supp. 59; Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133
Pac. 1040; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. 109, 26 Atl. 304). The principal
case is in tine with the strict rule, am1' probably with the weight of authority.
W.:sT, J., dissented, basing his opinion partieufarly on two prior Kansas decisions (Murphy v. Fairmont Township, 8g Kans. 76<>; Kaflsas City·v. Siese,
71 Kans. 283). These cases, however, seem readily distinguishable from the
principal casC. The former was an action against a township to abate a nuisance
and to recover damages for injuries sustained thereby, in which the court
held that the plaintiff could not "under the settled rules of law" recover
damages for the injuries already sustained, though he could enjoin the continuance of such nuisance; and the latter was a suit for damages caused by
injuries resulting from a nuisance maintained by the city, not in the performance of any governmental function, and the QUestion presented in the principal· case was not touched upon in that decision at all. On the other hand,
the case of Fisher v. Township, 87 Kans. 674 is strong authority in support ·
of the decision in the principal case : and it can hardly be said that "the dissenting opinion is in greater consonance with the Kansas authorities"though see XXVI Yale L. J., 77, to the contrary.

w:

N:£GLIG:£NC:£-Du'l'Y OF MANUF...c:Tl..'RltR 'l'O !NSPJO:CT Goons.-Defendants, who
were manufacturers, sold step-ladders to a retailer and one of them was
purchased by plaintiff. In using the ladder it broke, and plaintiff received a
fall. It did not appear whether the defendant had tested the step ladders
before putting them on the market. Held, (though deciding for defendant
on other grounds) that the manufacturer was bound to test the step ladders
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before putting them on· the market, and ~here he failed to do so he would
be liable to an ultimate purchaser who was injured because of defects in the
ladder. Miller v. Steinfeld (1916), 16o N. Y. Supp. 8oo.
In this case the charge was not one of fraud, but of negligence. The question to be determined was the degree of care and vigilance incumbent upon
a manufacturer. The decision is in line with the recent case of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N. Y. 382, III N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440.
:holding that the manufacturer of an automobile was responsible for the fm-ished product, and was not at liberty io put that product upon the market
without subjecting the component parts to or4inary and simple tests. The
.question of the liability of a manufacturer, packei: or vendor to the ultimatt.
,Purchaser; as well as to persons not in privity of contract, for injuries from
d~fects in the article sold, has always been a vexing one. For a full discus.sion of this question see the note to Tomlinso11 v. Armour & Company, 19
L. R. A. N. S. 923, and the long list of cases there cited and reviewed, also
the note to Mazetti v. Armour & Compa11y, ~ L. R. A. (N. S.) 213. All
ihe earlier cases on this question are considered in these notes. In the later
-cases, and especially in MacPhcnson v. Buick Motor Company, supra, and the
l>rincipal case, we see an eXtension of the liability .of a manufacturer or ven-·
-Oor, both as to ihe duty required and as to the manufactured articles to
whif11 it applies. Earlier cases limi!ed the principle to poisons, explosives
and things of like nature which in thei~ normal operation are implementsi
.of destruction. See McCajfrey v. Mossberg & G. Mfg. Co., 23 R. I. 381, 50
Atl. 651: 55 L. R. A. 822, 91 Am. St. Rep. '637; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y•
.397, 57 Am. Dec..455; Davidson v. Nichols, II.Allen 514 For one early case
-in accord with principal case see Schubert v. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331. The
.duty to inspect is indep~ndent of contract, and the obligation arises at law.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra. Opposed to the doctrine of the
principal case is Cadillac Motor. Co. v., Johnson, 221 Fed. Soi, 137 C. G. A.
~79, L. R. A. 1915E 287. For a summary of the earlier cases see Huset v.
J. J. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed: 865, 57 C. C. A. 237; 61 L. R. A.
303. The manufacturei:: will not be 'excused from tqe duty of inspection be-cause he has bought the defect~ve part of the finished product from a rep-utable manufacturer. However, the duty to inspect will vary with the nature
-of the thing to be inspected. Richmond & Daw.Jille R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 149
U. S. 266, 272, 13 Sup. Ct. 837, 37 L. Ed. 728; MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. supra.
S~IC Pr;mroRHANC£-DAMAGES JN PI.ACS OF SP!CIFIC PrulroRMANCE.-

The plaintiff brought an action for specific performance of a contract for
·the sale Qf land. At the time of the commencement of his action, ·he knew
1:hat specific performance was impossible because the defendant did not have
title to th~ land, but his action was started i°' good faith and not for the
·purpose of evading a jury trial. Held, that damages should be awarded to
·the plaintiff in lieu of the relief sought. McLennan v. Ch:irch (Wis. 1916),.
:158 N. W. 73.
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The principal case is quite distinct from the class of cases which allow
damages as incidental relief when equitable relief is also given. Reese v.
Holmes, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 531; Garrish v. German Ins. Co., 55 N. H. 355;
Tayfoe v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. (U. S.) 390, 13 L. Ed. 187. ;fhe
weight of authority is that if the plaintiff, at the time of asking for equitable
relief, knew that such relief could not be granted or knew that the facts
warranted only legal relief, the court will not retain the case for the giving
of damages. Linden Inv. Co. v. Honstain Bros. Co., 22I Fed. 178, 136 C. C. A.
121; Elliott v. Page, 98-S. C. 400, 82 S. E. 62o; Farson v. Fogg, 205 Ill. 32(),
68 N. E. 755; Knudtson v. Robinson, 18 N. D. 12, n8 N. W. 1051. This rep-resents the better rule in both code a~d common law jurisdictions and under
the Federal Equity Rules of 1912. There are other cases, however, in accord
with the principal case. Knauf c'?- Tesch Co. v. Elkhart &c. Co., 153 Wis.
3o6, 141 N. W. 701, 48 L. R. A. N. S. 744; Amsler. v. McClure, 238 Pa. St.
409, 86 Atl. 294 (statutory). Upon principle, the weight of authority seems
to be the better rule. Equity does not sit for the purpose of entertaining
bills whose only object is to secure damages. This is a peculiar function of
the law courts sitting with a jury. Even the various Codes of Civil Procedure, while they purport to abolish the difference between actions in law
and in equity, ought not to be interpreted so as practically to abolish the trial
by jury in cases in which damages only can be recovered and the controversy is clearly legal.
SPECIFIC P~oRMANCE-lNADEQUACY oit CoNSID:ERATION.-The plaintiff's
intestate agreed to -sell property· worth $8,ooo to the defendant for -$2,0QO.
The defendant went into possession and paid the plaintiff's intestate a small
portion of the purchase price monthly, a sum less than the rental value, of
the premises. The parties were cousins by marriage. Upon the death of the
intestate, the plaintiff, as administrator, refused to aci:-ept the .regular payments and brought an action in ejectment to recover possession of the prem_ises. The defendant in a c;ross complaint asked for specific performance of
the contract. Held, that this relief should be denied and that the plainµff
should succeed in his action ·of ejectment. O'Hara v. Lynch (Cal. 1916),
157 Pac. 6o8.
The decision in the principal case would seem to be clearly governed by
§ 3391 (1) of the C1v. ConE which provides that specific performance cannot
be enforced against a party "if he has not received an adequate consideration
for the contract." There are similar code provisions in Montana and South
Dakota. The court held that, while the consideration of love and affection
might be considered as part of the consideration, still it could not be considered as sufficient to make the total consideration adequate in this case.
The overwhelming weight of authority in absence of such statutes is 'that
inadequacy of consideration, unaccompanied by an)'. fraud, mistake or unfairness is not ground for denying specific performance. Coles v. Treco.thick, l Smith K. B. 233, 9 Ves. Jr. 244, 246, 7 Rev. Rep. 167, 32 Eng. Reprint
592; Ketcham v. Owen, 55 N. J. Eq. 344, 36 Atl. 1095; Se;vmo,;r v. Delancy,
.3 Cow. 445, IS Am. Dec. 270. There are cases however to the contrary:
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Dodd Seymour, 21 Conn. 475; Clement v. Reid, 9 Sm. & M. 535 (Miss.).
The rule laid down by Lord Er.ooN in the leading case of Coles v. Trecothick is that inadequacy of consideration, in order to be ground for denying
specific perfOtmance: must be such "as .shocks the conscience and amounts
to conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud." This rule was criticized by
Chancellor ~NT in Seymour v. Delancy, in which all the Justices voted with
the Chancellor -and were overruled by a vote of the Senators. The opinion
of the Chancellor is entitled to very great weight. His argument was that
equity will never enforce a bargain which involves gr.eat hardship. This
is well settled principle of equity. Williamson v. Deis, 114 Ky. 9()2, 72 S.
W. 292; ~atf!"s Co. v. Bates, 87 Ill App. 225. The hardship of an inadequate
price is just as much of a hardship as that of a forfeiture. But the c9urts
have, in following.Lord·Et.JioN's famous words, made an apparent exception
of a hardship resulting from mere inadequacy of price. In effect, they ha\'e
said they will enforce contracts in which the hardship is inadequacy of price
but_in all other cases will not enforce contracts in\'olving great hardship on
the defendant. Comparatively few courts have followed the reasoning of
Chancellor ~NT and"the only remedy seems to he a statutory one.
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